Tuesday, April 26, 2011

Cohen - Racketeer's Progress

Cohen, Andrew Wender. The Racketeer's Progress: Chicago and the Struggle for the Modern American Economy, 1900-1940. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004

Argument
Cohen complicates the historiography from the Progressive Era through the New Deal by adding a large new body of actors to the corporations and their laborers: craft workers and small businessman. Focusing on Chicago, Cohen shows how craftsmen resisted corporate modernization and battled against corporations to protect their trades' spaces. Cohen reveals a system of order and law governed not by the official legal system but by cooperation and oversight among the trade unions and associations, enforced "through fines, strikes, boycotts, pickets, assaults, bombings, and shootings." In the twenties these associations began to turn toward powerful crime syndicates such as Al Capone to defend their trade, leading to the legal term "racketeer" which differentiated (quite loosely) illegal organization from legal organization, and was often used to persuade jurors against craft unions. Throughout, corporations sought to break up the craft associations through traditional legal routes with some success, although quite often craftsmen managed to merely ignore court rulings and quickly bounced back from any union-busting moments. Ironically, racketeering during the New Deal was redefined in a way that protected craft unions.

Craftsmen were ambivalent toward Progressives and their ideas of reform, who in turn had a superior attitude toward craftsmen. Progressive Era courts rebuked craftsmen for their attempts at controlling trade.

Key Terms
open shop/closed shop - Early in the century corporations campaigned for an "open shop" relationship to craftsmen which would allow them to pursue craft services in an open market, while craftsmen sought to maintain their market power through organization in a "closed shop" excluding non-members.

Review
Jentz, JAH
Cohen "wants to displace mass production labor from the center of labor history before World War II." In the 1920s courts moved from using injunctions against union activities to criminal prosecution of craft leaders.

Elliot J. Gorn, Business History Review
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25096959

"Modernizing the economy was not a smooth process?it was "violent, contingent, and contested." Powerful labor organizations, which occasionally resorted to tactics like bomb ings and beatings, prevented national corporations from wholly impos ing their will on Chicago; such labor activism also provided the tem plate for federal practices during the New Deal. Cohen goes on to contest five ideas he says dominate historians' in terpretation of the early twentieth century. Modernity implies that the American economy, along with the state and society, had attained maturity by the Progressive Era; that incorporation, technology, mechanization, and free markets had transformed the nation. In fact, large segments of Chicago were still "premodern," in the sense that many workers re mained ensconced in small-scale firms where their muscle, knowledge, and skill gave them considerable power."

Friday, April 22, 2011

Goodwin - Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream

Goodwin, Doris Kearns. Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream. New York: Harper & Row, 1976.

Argument
Like Dallek, Goodwin aims at an amateur psychological evaluation of what went wrong with the LBJ presidency.

Review
Andrew Rolle - Pacific Historical Review
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3637544

"What does the Kearns volume tell us about Johnson intrapsychically
that would help to explain his later conduct during America's
greatest recent tragedy, the violent war in Vietnam? Filled with
powerful emotions, including a vague and ill-defined rage, Johnson
also revealed a deep-seated need to be loved. Ambivalence resulting
from deprivation lay at the heart of his "life-style." At times Johnson
was alternatively cold, distant, sober, energy-bound, humble, earnest,
and desensitized (lacking in affect) to the point of dullness and
boorishness...Kearns creates a portrait of a flawed yet gifted manipulator."

Tuesday, April 19, 2011

Schlesinger - The Imperial Presidency

Schlesinger, Arthur M. The Imperial Presidency. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004.

Argument
The Constitution granted the President extraordinary power and authority in leading America in foreign affairs. As a consequence, the modern President has been able to expand his powers to enormous levels out of times of foreign crises. The Cold War, in particular, led the executive branch to increase its power in making war without a declaration by Congress, to expand its secrecy protections, and to expand the use of Executive privilege.

Schlesinger also provides another concept: The Revolutionary Presidency, which seeks to stretch the power acquired through the Imperial Presidency into domestic affairs.

Nitty Gritty
The founders granted the President extraordinary leeway in foreign policy because it was expected that neither Congress nor the public would be experts in foreign affairs. Indeed this has more or less proven to be the case.

Schlesinger uses Lincoln as a model for how Presidents might reasonably exceed their explicit constitutional powers in an emergency; critically, Lincoln insisted that his broad claims of power were specific to the setting, and thus should not be taken as a permanent expansion of the office.

Schlesinger also notes the tendency of Congress to move to reclaim its power after periods of strong executive power. (After the Civil War, after WWI, and momentarily after WWII).

The Cold War looms over the Imperial Presidency. WWII led to a resurgence of the Presendancy, with Korea pushing it to a new level. But Vietnam is the key war. Both LBJ and especially Nixon expanded the powers of the President immensely, particularly in its secrecy system (which Schlesinger intriguingly suggests is based on the false assumption of national security, but actually exists largely to protect the government from embarassment).

Nixon's creation of a large professional army also gives the Presidency extraordinary leeway in sending an army on peacekeeping missions and other foreign ventures quickly with limited oversight.

After Watergate, Schlesinger wondered if the Imperial Presidency was in jeopardy. But Reagan and, more so, Bush II led to a resurgence. Bush II relied on the secrecy system to an even greater extant than even Nixon.

Review
JAH - Sydney Warren
"Richard M. Nixon, the author says, "for all his conventionality of utter- ance and mind was a genuine revolutionary." By his style and actions he defied tradition and made unprecedented assaults on the Constitution: his usurpation of the war-making power, his interpretation of the appointing power, his unilateral termination of statutory programs, his enlargement of executive privilege, his theory of impoundment, his deliberate disparage- ment of his cabinet, his discrediting of the press." [Warren points out that it is unclear whether Nixon's personality caused this or the national security state inevitably led to this.]

Dallex - Flawed Giant

Dallek, Robert. Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Argument
Dallek proposes that the best explanation for both the remarkable successes and devastating defeats of the LBJ presidency lie in his personality. He believed he was and strove to be the greatest President ever. At the same time, he suffered a constant crisis of confidence that led him to paranoia and indecision.

Domestic
How did he get so much done? p.236
1. The Johnson treatment - unparalleled relationship with a Congress that was, until 1966 midterm, incredibly favorable. 2/3 of both houses is a rarity
2. The legacy of Kennedy's death
3. The "national receptivity to righting historic wrongs and using federal power to improve people's lives." p.236

"Johnson had at least one indisputable triumph in domestic affairs for which he deserves credit. He played a large part in bringing the South into the mainstream of the country's economic and political life." p.625

"One observer of the mourners...overheard one black woman say to her little girl: 'People don't know it, but he did more for us than anybody, and President, ever did.'" p.623

Civil Rights Act 1964, Voting Rights Act of 1965
Medicare for the elderly
Medicaid for the impoverished
War on Poverty
Environmental Protection
Education - teachers, high school, college
Tranportation
Urban development - response to urban riots

Vietnam
Dallek portrays LBJ as constantly searching and hoping for an avenue to negotiate with Hanoi, a sign that part of him knew he had not quite grasped a winning strategy for Vietnam. By 1966, he felt he had to see the episode through though he knew his previous estimate of reaching an end to the conflict by 1967 would not come to pass.

Given America's aerial supremacy, LBJ long believed that bombing North Vietnam would tip the tide. But it didn't.

Dallek also frequently notes public opinion polls that show the American public generally agreed with LBJ's assessment of how the war should be fought, up until Tet.

The mounting American death toll led LBJ to personalize the war, drawing the conclusion that he had better not lose the war (not that he had better end the war).


Connection
While Halberstam blames the Vietnam quagmire largely on the flow of information created by a willful desire by those close to the action to deceive those in Washington into continuing a hopeless situation, Dallek presents Vietnam as a problem caused by LBJ's personality and political maneuverings. Following the Gulf of Tonkein incident, LBJ wanted to hide the growing scope of Vietnam as long as possible to thus avoid diminishing the momentum of the Great Society. By the time the public and Congress began to pay closer attention to Vietnam in 1966, it was too late to reverse course (at least in LBJ's mind and the mind of most of his advisors). Once it became apparent to other experts that Vietnam had reached a stalemate, LBJ still refused to seek a way out. For example, he saw McNamara's proposal to declare victory and leave as a personal betrayal, and banished McNamara to the World Bank.

Connection to Broad Political Themes
The irony of LBJ is that he tried more than any President to create programs for the benefit of just about every American, conceivably bringing them all into the Democratic camp. Yet his Presidency marks the end of the New Deal coalition.

Reviews
Gil Troy - JAH
Both the Great Society and Vietnam were rooted in LBJ's emotional emptiness, which fed his grandiosity. "Fearing rejection, Johnson minimized the commitment to achieve both goals." Ultimately, then, he never felt he fully achieved his Great Society goals.

Thursday, April 14, 2011

Parmet - The Democrats

Parmet, Herbert S. The Democrats: The Years After FDR. New York: Macmillan, 1976.

Argument
The book begins with the funeral of LBJ. Though it was published in 76, Parmet is fully aware that LBJ's demise represented the decline of the New Deal coalition. This book tells how that coalition changed and maintained after FDR.

Truman - Moved right in foreign affairs (Cold War), and never able to put his Fair Deal into practice because of foreign distractions. Parmet also argues that the splintering of the Democratic party in 1948 actually helped Truman. Wallace's Progressive party actually placated moderates, making Truman look moderate. Thurmond's Dixiecrats made Truman look good in Civil Rights.

Eisenhower years - Adlai appealed to intellectuals and liberals, and while the Democrats managed to retake the House and Senate, the public showed a preference for the apparently non-politician President who was willing to work with the Democrats and didn't take on the New Deal.

JFK - Upon election, seen as the Democratic version of Nixon: the product of a slick political package, rather than a true Liberal. Style over substance. Even his inaugural address was mostly style with very little specifics

New Frontier - education, Civil Rights, housing

LBJ - Thought to be conservative but turned out to be quite Liberal, in Civil Rights and Great Society.


Review:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2208037
Doenecke - Journal of Southern History

Parmet portrays Stevenson as a conservative, a man whose "stature
impressed just about everybody but a majority of the electorate" (p. 102).
The Illinois governor had a probusiness bias, endorsed FEPC with obvious
reluctance, refused to take a militant pro-Israel stance, and stressed education
as the primary solution to racial tensions. During the Eisenhower
years the party leadership-concentrated in the Congress-shied away
from attacking McCarthyism, presented few alternatives to the President's
programs, and avoided the liberal Democratic Advisory Council.
The Kennedy leadership, so the author continues, was personal, not
partisan, as the party machine had little to do with policy making. Unlike
historians who stress the inertia in America during the early 1960s, Parmet
sees the new administration as remarkably successful, and he cites as
evidence congressional acceptance of a series of proposals ranging from
liberalized trade to the Peace Corps. Problems lay rather in JFK's overreacting
to such international crises as Cuba and Berlin and in a political
style that stressed rhetoric over reality.
In his coverage of the Johnson years Parmet stresses that the executive
department assumed patronage and fund-raising activities, thereby virtually
dismantling the Democratic National Committee. Turning to the
party defeats of 1968 and 1972, he calls Robert F. Kennedy's bid to power
"one of the most . .. clumsy moves in American political history" (p. 249)
but notes that Eugene McCarthy was "regarded as a moderate liberal at
best . . ." (p. 265) and that George McGovern was "certainly not a
radical" (p. 297). After Nixon's second presidential victory the party
hardly possessed anything resembling a program.
The book is particularly strong in its coverage of the South. Like V. 0.
Key, Parmet finds that the South was never monolithic. He shows that
poll-tax proponents were afraid of "undesirable" whites as well as of
blacks and that regional fears of racial equality emerged from a desire to
preserve the economic status quo. He notes how many prominent southern
politicians helped keep most of the South for Truman in 1948, how
Stevenson's detente with the South secured his nomination in 1956, and
how Kennedy depended upon the South to get important bills through
Congress.

Dershowitz - Supreme Injustice

Dershowitz, Alan M. Supreme Injustice: How the High Court Hijacked Election 2000. Oxford: New York, 2001.

Argument
Bush v. Gore marked the low point in the history of the Supreme Court measured against the ideal of a nonpartisan branch of government. Dershowitz goes through the legal analysis of the case, reiterating again and again to his most damning point: that the justices would not have decided the same way if the roles of the two candidates had been reversed. Also repeated: the ruling was inconsistent with previous rulings by the justices.

Importantly, Dershowitz suggests motives for the 5 majority justices.

Overview
Nov 18 - The Florida Supreme Court decided to prevent Sec State of FL Kathleen Harris from certifying the election until it heard Gore's case for the merits of making a hand recount.
Nov 21 - Fl supreme court ordered to count all ballots that reflected the clear intent of the voter.
After this - Republicans went to site of counting in Miami-Dade and intimidated the counters into stopping.
Nov 24 - The Supreme Court shocked most experts by agreeing to hear the case, appealed by Bush's team.
Nov 26 - Harris certifies Bush as the winner. Bush's legal team almost withdraws case, but decides to go forward.
Dec 3 - Supreme Court unanimously vacates the Fl SC Nov 21 decision, asking it to clarify its opinion. Argument: state legislature has right to determine how electors are chosen, and the SC may have given too much weight to the constitution in its interpretation. (Dershowitz: Fl SC had done what all courts have done for centuries in resolving conflict between two statutes.)
Dec 8 - Fl Court followed implicit advice, clarifying the standards employed by the Legislature.
Dec 9 - US SC ruled that the court actually DID have the power to impose a standard for the recount, but since they didn't they violated the equal-protection standard, thus causing irreparable harm to Bush and the nation. The counting was stopped even before hearing argument.

Nitty Gritty
Significant Firsts
-Presidential election decided by a Supreme Court
-Vast majority of law experts and observers, across the spectrum, agreed that the majority decision was bad constitutional law, and motivated by improper considerations.

The case was about the overall recount, not about specific voting problems in Florida, although Dershowitz discusses:
-The Butterfly Ballots of Palm Beach County
-The flaws (up to 5% inaccuracy) of the Votomatic machine - the punch ballot reader. Dershowitz notes that every machine recount comes up with different numbers.

Gore's camp's strategy was to "Count all the votes," which they tried to stick to because it helped their public image, although they focused extra-hard on counting the votes that would presumably favor Gore.

Motives

O'Connor - Wanted a Bush victory so she could retire and thus assure a conservative replacement. (Note: in the aftermath of the debacle, as Dershowitz predicted, she waited until 2005 to retire to thus rebuild her legacy.)
Kennedy - The swing-vote in this court, Kennedy was hoping to be named chief justice when Rehnquist stepped down, as he would be expected to do under a Republican President. He would have little chance of being promoted by a Democratic President because of his ties to Reagan.
Thomas - Reliably right wing, and bitter at the Democrats for the Anita Hill hearings.
Scalia - Most ideological and opinionated of all the justices, but Dershowitz (admitting to liking him personally) found it hard to believe he would be motivated by personal factors (while others called for him to recuse himself). Scalia abandoned principle for a partisan decision (to Dershowitz's disappointment).
Rehnquist - "No one I know seriously considered the possibility that Rehnquist had an open mind in this case." He wanted to retire, and he has always been a partisan.

Lassiter - The Silent Majority

Lassiter, Matthew D. The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

Argument
The "Silent Majority" (Nixon's term) of the south represents not the direct descendants of racist segregationists but rather the coalescing of moderate suburbanites (neither racist segregationists nor anti-racist segregationists) under a class-based, rather than a race-based, perception of the world.

Middle class suburbanites opposed court-ordered busing to desegregate schools because they believed they had earned the right, through individualist achievement/merit, to send their children to the best schools. Similarly, they felt that they had the right to live in a neighborhood of their choosing, that reflected their achievements. Naturally, this implied that they would live in a white neighborhood; skin color became a sign not of racial inferiority but of class inferiority.

Nitty Gritty
Lassiter is complicating the notion that the political leanings of the south coalesced over residual racism. Rather, they were absorbed by the Republican party, first by Nixon, because the Republican party's anti-government stance appealed to their individualist perception that they would be happiest if they were, and that they deserved to be, left alone.

White-collar families claimed a "color-blind" innocence, insisted on consumer rights, and denied that residential segregation was the outcome of structural racism.

"During the decades after World War II, the metropolitan Sunbelt replaced the rural Black Belt as the center of political power in the South, and a two-party system dominated by the interests of large corporations and the priorities of white-collar suburbs supplanted the traditional culture of white supremacy that governed the Jim Crow era." p.2

Concurrently, the ascendence of the metropolitan Sunbelt resulted in both the fading of southern distinctiveness (both political and cultural) as well as the collapse of the New Deal order - as the south suburbanized, so too did America as a whole, and thus so too did American politics.

Lassiter refutes the traditional argument that the conservative shift in America was the result of a top-down Southern Strategy launched by the Republicans in order to exploit white backlash against the Civil Rights movement. As Lassiter notes, none of the white backlash political movements actually worked: Wallace, State's Rights Party, and even Barry Goldwater. Lassiter moves the arena of focus from the Deep South slightly north to the Sunbelt South.

Tale of Two Cities
Atlanta: unequal school system with concentration of poor black students. Why? Atlanta made only token efforts to desegregate, annexed white suburbs (thus cutting black voting power), allowed upwardly mobile blacks to move into white neighborhoods which chased lower-class whites out of the city,

Charlotte: one of most integrated public school systems in country. Why? Initially, looked like Atlanta as blacks were pushed into subsidized housing area. But because the school system was county-wide, and not city, and because the state laws mandated automatic annexation of dense suburbs, the Charlotte district remained diverse. Blue-collar white parents were thus put in a position to support county-wide desegration because they were on the wrong side of white-collar suburban parents' efforts to boycott mandatory busing.

Connection
Lassiter builds explicitly off of Kenneth Jackson's Crabgrass Frontier - he emphasizes the importance of federal funding in highways as well as low-interest mortgages and tax deductions in forming a white suburb, while urban housing policies led to a black ghetto.

Reading this alongside Wilentz's "Age of Reagan," I can't help but think this is a useful prequel to Wilentz's period. As Wilentz himself notes, if not for Watergate, his book might have been titled the Age of Nixon.

H-net review: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=13055