Friday, March 11, 2011

Gitlin - The Whole World is Watching

Gitlin, Todd. The Whole World Is Watching. Berkeley (Calif.): University of California press, 2003.

Argument
Gitlin explores how the portrayal of the student movement in the 1960s (mainly SDS) in mass media (he focuses on NY Times and CBS) undermined the movement's goals and eventually helped bring about its decline. Gitlin was president of SDS from June 1963 to June 1964. As he transitioned out of the movement into a career in the media he was struck by the fact that many people who had followed the rise of the student movement thought of it differently from how he thought of it as an insider. Gitlin realized this was a result of how the movement was framed by television (primarily) and newspapers. For a variety of reasons journalists inherently portrayed the New Left as a threat to the dominant ideals, and thus positioned it negatively for their average viewers.

Gitlin argues that SDS's very growth into a mass organization was its downfall. (31) As the war escalated, protestors in and out of SDS became more militant, thus positioning themselves farther left of the dominant ideology; of course, the media was all to ready to frame them as such. The media amplified and sped up the transitions of SDS after 1965.

Gitlin originally wrote this in 1980 so his communications theory has yet to be informed by post-Marxist ideas of Fiske and Hall (although he mentions Stuart Hall as, along with Raymond Williams, a key scholar to use Gramsci's ideas on popular culture). In particular, it would be interesting to see how he responds to Hall's ideas of three types of reception: dominant, negotiated, and resistant. As it is, Gitlin imagines the audience as mainly viewing the student movement through a dominant perspective. Still, his use of "framing" is persuasive, and he might argue that, if indeed most of the audience viewed the SDS from a dominant perspective, it is because the media framed the SDS largely as a threat to the dominant hegemony. On the other hand, the media focus on the SDS began with a favorable article in the New York Times. It seems to me that the student movement was seen as a threat to average American values PRECISELY because they WERE a threat to average American values!

Why did the Media do this?
Gitlin is using Gramsci to suggest the media serves to sustain, protect, and promote the dominant hegemonic ideology. Gitlin sees the media as complex industry motivated by corporate interests occasionally (though even he admits this is rarely a cause), and journalistic standards more often. However, journalistic practice requires that news meet a set of criteria for it to be newsworthy. The mere pursuit of conflict means that a journalist will use various "frames" to position a protest in conflict - in this case, because the protest was geared toward dominant ideology, the media portrayed protesters as a threat. Moreover as the New Left underwent its own transition after 1965 from the old guard to the new midwestern (non-NE) base, the media emphasized this internal conflict, helping to further drive a wedge in the movement's leadership problems.

Personal Application
This is a fascinating and encouraging study which uses the very media theory I am studying to write history. It goes back to a certain period and questions what the role of the media was in shaping an understanding of the period. If it is flawed in perhaps imagining the audience as fairly passive (typical of communications at that moment it was written), it is nonetheless persuasive as far as it goes in suggesting an important role for the media in how the student movement was perceived.

The relationship between a movement and the media (285)

Two internal factors increase a movement's dependency on mass media
1.) narrowness of social base [New Left: students and young intelligentsia]
2.) commitment to specific society-wide goals [end the war]
Two factors that produce destructive consequences of media dependency
3.) movements turn toward revolutionary desire and rhetoric in nonrevolutionary situations [following the 1965 March on Washington and as the war escalated, students began to perceive the war as less an accident than a result of American imperialism. Thus, they began to become more militant, sensing a revolution was necessary.]
4.) unacknowledged political uncertainties, particularly about legitimacy of its own leaders [lack of coherent ideology and organization coupled with inability to articulate criteria for leadership made it vulnerable. Leaders began to pursue celebrity.]


Key Words
Media frames - "persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual." -p7

Halberstam - Best and the Brightest

Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 1972.

Argument
Halberstam uses his reporters' eye and writing skill to set the personalities of the JFK and LBJ Presidencies over the written evidence (particularly from the Pentagon Papers, which emerged a year before this was published) to answer the question: How and why did such intelligent, thoughtful men get involved in the quagmire (as Halberstam's '65 book title called it) of Vietnam?

More specifically, their faith in bombing's chances of success was misplaced and could have been anticipated, and they never fully grasped why France had lost so they were doomed to repeat those mistakes.

The How - From as early as 1950 through JFK Presidency, intelligence and diplomatic correspondence from Vietnam, as well as from policy experts state-side (George Kennan, for example) was filtered before it reached the White House to paint a positive and optimistic picture and support the vision of a winnable intervention in Vietnam. At the same time, various military officers were presenting truthfully pessimistic reports from the field, but they too were filtered out to give the White House what commanders thought they wanted to hear.

The Why - Halberstam suggests that had the post-WWII anxiety about communism not been so thick in the U.S., America would have supported Vietnamese nationalism. Set against Korea (a relatively traditional geopolitical war rather than the nationalist war of Vietnam) and the fall of China, however, the U.S. opted to support France, and eventually step into France's place. Culturally at that moment in time, most U.S. leadership could not see Vietnam for what it truly was: a nationalist war, not a Cold War war.

Culpability of Individuals
JFK - JFK may have erred in putting Dean Rusk in Sec State; he wanted a weak Sec State and got that, but a stronger Sec State might have pushed more policy recommendations in front of JFK instead of telling him what he wanted to hear. When the few honest, pessimistic reports reached him, he was furious. Halberstam implies JFK might not have proceeded with the war escalation LBJ did.

LBJ - Persevered in Vietnam partly because he felt he owed it to JFK's legacy, partly out of his personality.

McNamara - "even if he was brilliant, [McNamara] was not wise." Mac's success in reorganizing the defense budget came from collecting data and making a thorough analysis on his own, outside of the recommendations of military. In Vietnam, he took the reports of others at face values from the beginning.

Westmoreland - Intentionally lowered estimates of troops needed. "Lyndon Johnson was a great salami slicer, and no one was smarter than Westmoreland at knowing how much salami to order at a given time, how much he would be allowed to carry home."

Useful link
http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/03/15/home/halberstam-best.html
Critique: assumption implied by Halberstam, that the history might have been different if the people who understood Vietnam, as well as the people who understood LBJ, had been in the positions of power. This seems to undermine the thesis: the best and the brightest weren't good enough, and were victims of history, bureaucracy, and the Cold War.

Deception of the elite military and bureaucrats: the American public, each other, and themselves

"What shortly becomes clear is that no single military turning point, no single or two or three arch villains explains anything. "Dean Acheson was the architect of our commitment to Vietnam." The Europeanists got us in there to support the French. The Kennedys got us in there because "it gave them opportunities for grace under pressure." The Bay of Pigs really did it because ironically, its aftermath saw "the strengthening of State's tough-minded realists," and the weakening of those less inclined to use force, like Bowles. Maxwell Taylor and the military mind are really responsible because as late as 1961 he mistakenly saw Korea as the parallel war, whereas as Halberstam points out, "The former was a conventional war with a traditional border crossing by a uniformed enemy massing his troops; the latter was a political war conducted by guerrillas and feeding on subversion." Walt Rostow...is the culprit because of his infectious enthusiasm, as a member of the L.B.J. White House, for air war. Machismo, says Halberstam, "was no small part of it." [particularly for LBJ] ...Westmoreland and McNamara are guilty because of their misplaced confidence in ground troops. L.B.J. was the real war criminal when he deceived the American people in July, 1965... Dean Rusk ("color him neutral or color him hardline. Which side was he on? . . .") ought to take the rap because he never spoke up; he never fought; he let McNamara take over State. Take your pick the list is endless. What's interesting, though, are not any key decisions or decision-makers, but the pattern that emerges, a phenomenon we might call The Fallacy of the Misplaced Center. " - From NYT review

Wednesday, March 9, 2011

Bennett - Party of Fear

Bennett, David Harry. The Party of Fear: From Nativist Movements to the New Right in American History. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988.

Argument
Bennett periodizes extremist Right movements in American history. He argues nativism was the unifying trait until the 1921 immigration quotas closed the door to the flood of immigrants. In the 1930s, inverted nativism attacking elites began to appear, culminating after World War II with McCarthyism. Throughout the Cold War, communist conspiracy theories most prominently the John Birch Society abounded on the extreme right, though never taking up the nativist strains that they had in 1919. Bennett charts the rise of the New Right, particularly the Religious Right of Buchanon, Falwell, et al - their brief decline and the end of the Moral Majority in 1990, and their reemergence as the Christian Coalition during the Clinton Presidency. The religious right warned that the govt was being steered in an amoral and evil direction away from tradition family values. More anti-govt were contempoary the militia movements. The book ends on the verge of the 1996 election.

Thus, we see a broad period of Nativism (Know-Nothings to first Red Scare to 20s KKK), followed by inverted Nativism (Father Coughlin, Gerald LK Smith) stretching into the Cold War (McCarthyism). Cold War conspiracy theories morphed into anti-govt conspiracy theories (John Birch Society), blending with the rise of the religious right lead to movements ranging from the mass movements of the televangelists to neo-Nazis to Militias to the tiny movements of Christian Identity (Jesus was not a Jew, Americans are God's true chosen people).


Monday, March 7, 2011

Leuchtenburg - Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-40

Leuchtenburg, William Edward. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940. The New American Nation series. New York: Harper & Row, 1963.

Argument
FDR's New Deal was not so much a revolution as a reshuffle of the old system that had failed with a new deal designed mainly to alleviate an economic crisis.

The Expansion of Government
Leuchtenburg acknowledges in the New Deal project (and FDR in particular) to the Progressives, but complicates that relationship. New Dealers lacked the desire for reform to the point of social transformation. They didn't want to change people, but rather wanted to make the world better for people. Unlike Progressivism, the New Deal was not sentimental: it avoided claiming relief was humanitarian, but rather justified it as something to stabilize the economy.
"The New Dealers reflected the tough-minded, hard-boiled attitude that pemeated much of America in the thirties." (338) Ex. Imagine James Cagney or Humphery Bogart working on economic policy.

The New Deal empowered workers and took on corporations as entities. It emphasized community and teamwork and took on individualism.

Part of the expansion was the inability of state and local governments to deal with the crisis. Ex. the crime sprees of John Dillinger, who could not be stopped much less kept in jail until federal authorities got involved.

The most revolutionary change was to the role of the executive. Not since Washington and Andrew Jackson had the role of the President been so changed. Congress had dominated legislative creation even into the Progressive Era, but after the New Deal Congress looked to the President to set the agenda and (like TR and Wilson) send drafts of bills on to Congress. The development that best symbolizes this is Roosevelt's order in 1939 to create the Executive Office of the President, which formalized a place for six bureaucrats working under him, eventually expanding to oversee bureaucracy like the budget, NSC, and CIA.

For all of these developments, Leuchtenburg ultimately credits FDR. His leadership, relationship with the public, administrative style, and creativity was the driving force of the New Deal.

Historiography
Leuchtenburg is typical of the pro-New Dealers who agreed with FDR politically and thus view the New Deal positively. Anti-New Dealers fall into 2 camps, just as Bennett's lecture title suggests "Liberal hero, radical disappointment, Conservative Devil." Socialist critics feel he should not have propped up capitalism. Conservatives feel he abandoned the free market with dangerous results.

Barthes - (i) Operation Margarine; (ii) Myth Today

Barthes, Roland. “(i) Operation Margarine; (ii) Myth Today.” From Durham, Meenakshi Gigi, and Douglas Kellner. Media and Cultural Studies: Keyworks. Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 2001, 99-106.

Taken from Mythologies, Barthes' examination of how bourgeois societies assert values in their cultural productions

(i) Notices a trend in film, fiction, and advertising - certain things (institutions like the army, products like margarine) are first critiqued in regards to their drawbacks to the point of dismissal before being exalted at the close.

(ii) Here's how these "myths" work for the petit-bourgeoisie:

  1. Inoculation - acknowledge accidental evil in an institution to conceal its principal evil
  2. Privation of history - Remove the history of the object, leaving it to merely be enjoyed without wondering where it came from
  3. Identification - Can't imagine the Other. Can only blind himself, ignore and deny, or else transform him into something else. If he can identify with nothing in the Other, he calls it exotic, thus transforming the Other into an object.
  4. Tautology - A distrust of language, rejected because it has failed, leads to the dead and empty tautology: i.e. "because that's how it is.
  5. Neither-Norism - Stating, balancing, and ultimately rejecting two opposites, allowing one to flee from an intolerable reality.
  6. The quantification of quality - Intelligence, artistic experience, leisure have all been economized, so that their experience is balanced by the cost of a ticket.
  7. The statement of fact - Myths tend toward proverbs. Common sense provides the foundation for a truth that is formed by the arbitrary values of the ruling order.
Essences - Bourgeois ideology tends to develop the products of history into essential types thus obscuring its own historical process.
Scales - These essences are also weighed in relation to each other to support the values of the ruling order.

Big problem: if we try to locate the very meaning at the heart of an object we will liberate it but destroy it. If we acknowledge its full weight we respect it but it remains mystified.
Conclusion: we are doomed to speak excessively about reality, "seeking a reconciliation between reality and men, between description and explanation, between object and knowledge."

Sunday, March 6, 2011

Rieff - The Triumph of the Therapeutic

Rieff, Philip. The Triumph of the Therapeutic; Uses of Faith After Freud. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.

Argument
"The religious psychologies of release (Jung, Reich, Lawrence) and the social technologies of affluence do not go beyond release and affluence to a fresh imposition of restrictive demands." (254)

"...a sense of well-being has become the end, rather than a by-product of striving after some superior communal end..." (261 [last sentence of book])

Rieff argues Freud's theories triggered the most consequential cultural revolution since Christianity subsumed the Roman Empire. (Note: Rieff is speaking of an apparently global revolution, but speaks mainly of Western culture. The East to Rieff in 1966 is the Soviet Union, which he argues is merely a more conservative attempt at a society designed for maximum improvement of individuals.) Freud replaced Christianity (and the religious impulse in general) with psychological analysis designed to release the individual from his psychological problems.

Rieff dedicates a chapter each to three of Freud's predecessors, Jung, Reich, and D.H. Lawrence, each of whom attempted to re-institute an element of faith into Freud's purely scientific system.

Jung - Unable to set his protestant faith aside as Freud had done with his Judaism, Jung imagined the "subterranean God" - the inner impulses Freud identified at work within man - as a replacement for the Heavenly Father.

Wilhelm Reich - Reich called himself a Freudo-Marxist. Reich, who admitted in his late-life memoirs that he thought himself a sort of prophet, imagined "Orgone," a universal energy (sexual...a replacement for Freud's libido...love is the supreme form of energy) which, if unleashed and embraced by individuals, would help bring about a moral and social revolution.

D.H. Lawrence - Lawrence idealized the innocent child, accepting Freud's theories about the sexuality of the child, and arguing the child is the perfect state of humans, one to be striven for.

A Definition of Culture
"To speak of a moral culture would be redundant. Every culture has two main functions: (1) to organize the moral demands men make upon themselves into asystem of symbols that make men intelligible and trustworthy to each other, thus rendering also the world intelligible and trustworthy; (2) to organize the expressive remissions by which men release themselves, in some degree, from the strain of conforming to the controlling symbolic, internalized variant readings of culture that constitute individual character." (232-3)

How this Fits
Freud is the revolutionary intellectual elite. Rieff is identifying his effect on culture, particularly, as he states over and over, his effect on American culture where he was most strongly embraced. As Freud's followers demonstrate, Freud left the world short of a full replacement of Christianity, but he seems to have started the process.

I feel like I was reading too much criticism of Freud into Rieff's writing, because the end of the first and last chapter seem to celebrate the potential for Freud's revolution to eventually replace the way Christianity created a culture that accepted social hierarchies and consoled the discontented with a promise of a better afterlife.

In a way, Rieff suggests Freud destroyed Christian culture and replaced it with nothing but individualism just as the US student movement critiqued fifties conformist culture and replaced it with nothing but individualism.

Rieff does critique the replacement of the Christian concern for community with a more selfish concern for the individual well-being, and acknowledges the loss of a clear moral system at the close: "What is moral becomes and remains self-evident only within a powerful and deeply compelling system of culture." (261) That system of culture has yet to to arise as of 1966, but Rieff seems to be hopeful for the the end of the cultural revolution Freud started.

However, here is where Lasch, Bell, Slater, Putnam, Lasch-Quinn, Hunter, and even Riesman (writing before Rieff, and perhaps more like Rieff than these others optimistic about the eventual results of this cultural revolution) begin to suggest how problematic the loss of a moral system is turning out to be. Lasch-Quinn bemoans the turn in the Civil Rights movement from the MLK/Christian concern with the community to the Black Power concern with individual well-being. Lasch, Bell, and Slater critique the 60s student movement for a similar obsession with individual well-being at the cost of the community. A decade later than these three, Putnam offers the sociological proof that the individual is being emphasized over the communal, while Hunter (less explicitly) explores the how religion has divided social activists on the right and the left to such an extant that they are unable to speak to each other, much less work together for the community's benefit, much less agree on how the community should be improved.

Tuesday, March 1, 2011

Riesman - The Lonely Crowd

Riesman, David, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denney. The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953.

Argument
The social character of the American people has shifted from "inner-directed" - those who internalize authority, as pioneers and individualists - to "other-directed" - those whose characteris formed through their peer-relationships. Riesman believes this occurs in all civilizations as they move from a period of rapid population growth to population equilibrium.

The underlying theory draws from and wrestles with both Weber's broad perspective of social changes in history, and Freud's conception of personality developing in childhood. Riesman believes character development has been changed by the many new influences on children outside of the home. These influences are tied to the development of history as evidenced most broadly by population change.

Riesman is careful throughout not to criticize "other-directness" and idealize "inner-directness," often resisting the label of "social criticism" for the book. But there is certainly social criticism here.

Key Terms (Note: Riesman admits this are ideal rather than real concepts)
high growth potential - no or slow growth rate, high birth and death rate.
tradition-directed people - not concerned with progress. Intent on continuing life as their ancestors did. Goals are established by the community to meet expected role.

transitional population growth - advances in health, technology, food production, etc lead to decreasing death rate. Population growth is high.
inner-directed people - tendency early in life to internalize a set of goals, inspired to do better than parents.

incipient population decline - death rate and birth rate regain equilibrium while life expectancy remains longer
other-directed people - tendency to be sensitized to the expectations and preferences of others

Key Developments
Morality - system of how you treat others - is important conforming system for inner-directed, while morale - system of how you feel and how you make others feel - is important conforming system for other-directed.

Parents play a much larger role in personal development for tradition-directed and inner-directed. Other-directed have a wider variety of influences: parents, teachers, peers, song and story, mass media.

Memory of the Book
Riesman acknowledges that he finds "other-directed people" mainly in the rising urban middle class. This is, indeed, how this book has come to be remembered for typifying the 1950s: the suited businessmen working in large organizations, the suburb as a false retreat, the rise of new prosperity inducing accumulation of material goods aimed at feeding the inner desires, the strong conformity from behavior to dress to politics. And yet, it was written in 1950 and reflects 30s and 40s characteristics.